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CHAPTER I
INTRODLCTION
The study of effective leadership in the conduct of
American Foreign relations is of unusual significance today because of the tension and discard which characterize relatims
between the East and West.

The tension between the Soviet Union

and the Western powers started after the successes made by Premier
Stalin after World War II.

By 1947, the Soviet Union had ex-

tended its control to many of the nations in Eastern Europe and
had failed to negotiate in good faith on global disarmament,
nuclear weapons and other post war problems.

This uncompromis-

ing and aggressive attitude made it clear to the West that the
primary objective of the Russian government was world conquest.
As a result, Prime Minister Churchill of England told an American
audience that an Iron Curtain had been constructed between East
and West by the Soviet Union.
The facts cited above marked the beginning of the cold
war, and the world became divided into two camps.

The Communists

direct the Eastern camp from Moscow and the Western camp functions
under the leadership of the United States with its government at
Washington, D.

c.

It is against this background that this paper

will undertake an examination of Presidential leadership in foreign
affairs in the United States.
-1-
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Under the American system of government, the President
is the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.

This

monopoly in foreign affairs can be traced to the authority
granted in Article II of the Constitution of the United States
and United States Supreme Court decisions.

This enables the

President to communicate for the country when negotiating with
foreign governments.

The American people expect him to promote

their national interest.

This paper will discuss the leadership

or the lack of it of two Presidents in four foreign affairs programs that were designed to contain Communism.

The containment

programs are the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, Point Four Program,
Formosa Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine for the protection
of the Middle East.
The objective of this study is to determine through evaluation the relative effectiveness of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D.
Eisenhower as organs of American Foreign relations in the Office
of President of the United States.

The judgement as to effective-

ness will be made on the basis of the leadership of the men in
two programs projected during the administration of each President.

Evidence of effective techniques of leadership ~ill be

tested by three criteria.

They are:

Leadership in the Concep-

tion and Initiation of Programs; (2) Leadership in the Molding
of Public Opinion; and (3) Leadership of the Congress.
It is not possible for the writer to measure precisely or
quantitatively the effectiveness of the performance of these men.
The writer will give a general indication of the relative effectiveness of the two men after evaluating the programs by the
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standards set to indicate effectiveness.

Also, the reader should

be aware of the general international conditions which led to
the establishment of each program.

President Truman ~as President

during the latter part of World War II and in the post war years.
President Eisenhower continued the containment policy that had
been started under the Democratic ldministration.
Method
The method used by the writer in preparing this paper was
the case study method.

A

case study of four foreign affairs pro-

grams, two initiated by Harry S. Truman and two by Dwight D.
Eisenhower, was made.
jective ,

All four programs had a common basic ob-

to contain the global expansion of the Soviet Union.

The activity of each President is studied separately in relation
to each of his two programs.

In studying each program, the writer,

using fair judgement, tested the actions of each leader by use of
the thr ee ·criteria of effective leadership listed earlier.

In the

last chapter, the writer, using his judgement as to what the evidence showed, states a conclusion.
Hypothesis
Professor Wilfred E. Binkley is a respected professional
student of American Political parties.
Partiesa

His book, American Political

A Natural History, is recognized as a great study and re-

ceived an American Political Science Association award.
preface of another book, President

and

In the

Congress- Professor Binkley

stated a commonly accepted theory respecting the role of strong

-4-

executive leadership in both parties.

He stresses the fact that

the Democratic party, as a general rule, tends to produce and
support strong executive leadership in government.

The Republi-

can Party, on the other hand, has an historical tendency to oppose
strong executive leadership in government and favor legislative
supremacy with respect to the executive power.

The difference

between the general tendencies of the two major parties on the
question of strong executive leadership is a result of the
greater influence of conservatism in the Republican Party.1
If Professor Binkley's theory is valid, President Truman
is more likely to offer a better example of effective leadership
as President of the United States than President Eisenhower.
Assuming the Binkley thesis to be valid as a general rule, the
writer based this research on the hypothesis that President
Truman as a Democratic President employed the techniques of
presidential leadership in his two programs more effectively
than did President Eisenhower.

It was expected that an examina-

tion of the facts with the use of the three generally recognized
criteria of effective leadership would show whether the hypothesis
is sound or not.
Criteria of Effective Presidential Leadership

in

Foreign Relation
This study seeks to evaluate the performances of Presidents
Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower as organs of United States
1Wilfred E. Binkley, The President and Congress (New Yorka
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947), p. vii.
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foreign relations in the Office of President of the United States
by three criteria of sound executive procedure.
are:

These criteria

(1) Leadership in the Conception and initiation of Programs,

(2) Leadership in the Molding of Public Opinion, and (3) Leadership of the Congress.
The American people are divided on many issues, but there
is virtual unanimity in the conception of the role of the President of the United States in the field of foreign affairs.

The

essential quality expected of him is executive leadership. 1 They
expect him to introduce measures to enhance the nation's security.
Sometimes the task will be difficult because of the principle of
separation of powers and its influence on the functioning of
American government.

However, he must use all legal techniques

at his disposal to rally support for his program.
Pendleton Herring saids
We have created a position of great power but have
made the full realization of that power dependent upon
influence rather than legal authority. Hence, if our
President is to be effective, he must be a politician as
well as a statesman. He must consider the political
e~pedience of contemplated actions as well as their consistency with his concept of the public interest. 2
Leadership in the Conception and Initiation of the Program
The President as the sole organ in the conduct of American
foreign policy can control the direction of it.

Woodrow Wilson

1Edward s. Corwin and Louis Koenig, The Presidency Today
(New Yorks University Press, 1956), pp. 63-64.
2Louis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency
(Chicagoa Public Administration Service, 1949), p. 63.

-6said that the initiative of the President "is virtually the power
to control absolutely."

This monopoly involves courage, vision,

imagination and boldness in formulating foreign programs.

He

must have the courage to follow his convictions in meeting problems
arising out of the international scene.

The President gets his in-

formation from agencies in the executive branch and the citizens
expect him to formulate measures to promote the national interest
on the basis of this information. 1
The President should also have a sense of direction.

This

involves knowing where he is going and what kind of program the
American people will accept.

Woodrow Wilson put this in dramatic

words when he saida
Men's hearts waits upon us, men's lives hang in the
balance, men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do.
Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dare fail to
try? I summon all men, all patriotic, all forward-looking
men to my side. God helping me, I wi;1 not fail them, if
they will but counsel and sustain me.
Leadership of Public Opinion
The President who is able to rally public sentiment behind
his foreign affairs program will be generally successful in having
his program enacted by Congress.
hear what he has to say.

The audience is always ready to

All of his actions are front page news.

In a democracy, no one else has such an advantage in mobilizing
. opinion.
. .
3
publ 1c
1

Henry Steele Commager, *'Yardstick for a Presidential
Candidate," The New York Times, VI (October 5, 1947), p. 49.
2

Ibid., P• 51.

3Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency (New Yorka
Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 147.
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The Executive can rally public sentiment by making
speeches before the public.

The most effective type of speak-

ing is that on television and radio.

His voice gives the people

confidence and the television brings the symbol of the nation
into the American home.

Professor Cushman said that a Presi-

dent with the "gift for leadership usually finds it possible to
create public sentiment." 1

The President can also mobilize

public sentiment through the press conferences •. If he is tactful enough to get reporters and editorial writers to follow his
proposals, their discussions in the various newspapers and
magazines will often build up a reservoir of public sentiment.

2

Leadership of the Congress
In providing leadership of the Congress, the President
must be able to persuade members of both parties to forget partisan
differences and unite behind his foreign affairs programs.

He has

the constitu~ional authority to discuss his proposals ~ith the
Congress in his state of the Union Message and any other message
that is desirable.

He also can make use of conferences at the
'

White House with congressional leaders of both chambers.
In addition to his messages to Congress, the executive
branch can provide effective leadership by doing several
things.

The executive branch should take an active part in the

committee hearings.

This would enable the staff to plead for

1c
. and Koen1g,
'
h Pr~sidency Today. p. 73.
orw1n
Te
2 Ibid., p. 71.
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enactment of the proposed programs.

The President and his

Secretary of State should have cordial personal relationships with
key congressmen.

The President and the Secretary of State can

write letters to influential congressmen at the opportune time and
this often increase support for the program.

The President and the

Secretary of State can also use the telephone to contact influential
congressmen and this often aids passage of proposals.

All of these

techniques have been used with varying degrees of success by the
t~o Presidents who are being evaluated.
The President should seek maximum collaboration by members of both parties in the formulation and execution of foreign
policy.

Bipartisanship is mainly a result of the methods used by

the Presi dent to achieve non-partisan cooperation in foreign
affatrs.

The ideal procedure to achieve this unity between the

two parties

is effective consultation.

This consultation should

involve allo~ing key members of each political party to participate
in the discussion of the proposed program.

Ideal consultation

would give the bipartisan leaders enough time to express themselves
candidly and compromise their differences.

After a decision has

been reached, consultation should be held again if the proposals
are modified. 1
The second recommended procedure in achieving bi-partisan
collaboration in foreign relations involves the identification and
use of an acceptable liaison group.

Such a group should include

1cecil V. Crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or
Reality (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 164-165.

key members of both parties who are on the Senate Foreign Relations
and the House Foreign Affairs Committees.

These two committees

could provide a helpful liaison between the President and Congress
in connection with any proposed foreign affairs program.

CHAPTER II
THE TRUMAN 00.:TR INE
Initiation and Conception
In 1946-George Kennan, recognized American authority on
Russian politics, stated the essence of our policy of containment.

This policy is the foundation of our foreign policy.

He

~as of the opinion that the United States "by applying economic
and military pressure from outside the orbit could promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the
break-up or the gradual mellowing of the Soviet power." 1 This
statement reflects the objective of the Truman Doctrine.
The Truman Doctrine was primarily directed toward Greece
and Turkey.

The policy was designed to reduce the chances of

domination of Greece or Turkey by forces connected with the Communists.

Greece was anti-Communist, but the nation was plagued

by poor economic conditions and numerous guerillas were attempting to overthrow the royalist regime.

The rebels included non-

Communists and pro-Communists, but they were regarded as serious.
This was true because their victory would mean an extension of
Russian influence over nations of great importance to the West.
The location of these nations is strategically important because

1Blair Bolles, "The Fallacy of Containment,"
(March 19, 1947), p. 327.
-10-

The Nation,

-11of their "positim in the Eastern Mediterranean near the strategic
Dardanelles and the oil-rich Middle East." Great Britian, under
Premier Churchill was providing military and economic support to
the regime .

However, by March, 1947, England was harassed by a

negative business cycle.

The British Ambassador informed the

United States State Department of this condition and asked our
country to take over the aid. 1
Turkey and Greece were of strategic importance to the
West.

Besides dominating the Dardanelles, Greece provides the

route to the Balkans.

Westemcontrol over this nation could cut

off the most direct sea route of the Soviets to the Middle East
oil fields.

In addition, American firms were contracting for a

thirty-inch pipeline which would extend from Saudi Arabia to the
Mediterranean and this contract would leave the United States
with the largest financial stake in this area. 2

Turkey is im-

portant because it controls the strategic strait between the
Black Sea and the Agean Sea, which is an extension of the Mediterranean.

In addition, Turkey adjoins Soviet Russia or faces it

across the Black Sea. 3
President Truman was aware of thjs situation and the repercussions that the loss of those nations would have on other
1oscar T. Barck and Nelson M. Blake, Since 1900 (New Yorka
The Macmillan Co., 1952), PP• 779-780.
2
"Internationalize Aid to Greece," The Christian Century.
(March 12, 1947), p. 325.
3 u. S. Department of State, Fact Sheeta Mutual Security
in Action, (Washington, D. C.a Government Printing Office, 1959),
PP• 1-5.

-12people who were struggling to maintain their freedom.

He request-

ed $400,000,000 to provide military and economic assistance to
these nations.

This he thought would reduce the threat of Com-

munism and keep these strategic nations outside of the Soviet
orbit.

The legislation provided for the sending of civilian and

military advisors to supervise the aid.

The President was author-

ized to withdraw any or all of the assistance on request from
either government.

Also, the recipient government had to give

freedom of movement to the press to observe how the aid was being
used.

An

amendment was added by Senator Arthur Vandenburg and

adopted by Congress which would allow the United Nations to determine when the aid should terminate. 1
The Greek-Turkish aid program was one of the most successful of all the policies promulgated by President Truman in the
international field.

He had enough vision to know ~nat the loss of

those nat ions would do to our national interests.

Senator

Vandenburg, distinguished Republican from Michigan, said that
"the fall of Greece, followed by the collapse of Turkey, could
precipitate a chain reaction which would threaten peace and security around the globe. 112 The fall of those nations would have
given the Communist forces a psychological advantage over peoples
seeking their freedom and would eventually undermine our national
security in Europe and the Middle East.

1Louis Koenig, The Truman Administration (New York:
York University Press, 1956), pp. 301-302.
2crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy. p. 57.

New

-13Leadership of Public Opinion
The President was able to rally public sentiment in his
special message to Congress.

The address was broadcast over the

r adio on March 12, 1947 and provided millions of families the
opportunity to hear him discuss the situation that had developed in
Greece and Turkey.

Presidential success in connection with any

proposal will be influenced greatly by his ability to use the
radio effectively.

President Truman also had an opportunity to

promot e the program in an address to the Democratic National Committee at a Jefferson Day celebration.

He discussed his proposals

for Greek-Turkish aid and stated that his by-passing of the United
1
Nations, in this case, would not make that body impotent.
The program was discussed by Paul Porter, Chief of the
President's Economic Mission to Greece.

He outlined the proposed

legislation to members of Americans for Democratic action.

He

told them that the aid was merited because of the danger of economic
2
col l apse and Communist control.
The Truman message was endorsed by the Board of Directors
of t he Greek War Relief Organization.

They viewed the aid as es-

sential to the inspiration of the Greek people.
tion lauded the proposals.

The Chairman

The Social Federa-

stated a hope that this

policy would prevent war. 3 The proposals were endorsed before the

1 Anthony Leviero, The New York Iime§,
2
The New York Times, March 30, 1947,
3
the New York Times, March 16, 1947,

April 6, 1947,

P• 46.
P• 3.

P• 1 •

-14Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the American Veterans
Committee, the Socialist party of New York, The Fellowship of
Reconciliation, the Post War World Council, the National Peace
Conference of New York and the Friends Committee on National
Legislation. 1 The National Trade Council endorsed the aid and
sent telegrams to President Truman, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, Senator Arthur Vandenburg and Representative Charles
A.

Eaton. 2
The most consistant critic of the proposed loan was

former Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace.

He denounced the

proposal while traveling in Europe and stated that our attempt
to contain the rapid growth of Russia would be futile.
"No free people can be bought.

He said

No unfree people will stay bought.

No powerful idea c~n be countered by a gun, however powerful the
gun might be. 113

He also accused the United States of disregard-

ing the United Nations.

He said the Greek-Turkish Aid proposals
would unite the world against us. 4
The vagueness of the aid proposal aroused negative sentiment against the measure.

The number of letters to congressmen

from citizens seeking clarification of the proposal was large.
However, much of the negative public opinion was associated with

1c. P. Trussell, The
PP• 17-18.
2The New York
Times,
3The Nev. York Times,
4The New York Times,

New York Times, March 27, 1949,
April 2, 1947, P• 21.
April 13, 1947, PP• 1, 42.
April 1, 1947, p. 9.
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the "crisis rally" which was sponsored by the Progressive
Citizens of America where 20,000 New Yorkers heard Henry A.
Wallace.

He told the audience that the Greek-Turkish aid plan

was fostering .American oil interests while subverting the United
Nations.l
The newspapers reflected positive public opinion respecting the measure.

Various poll results and other soundings

of public opinion indicated that the unanimous vote of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee reflected the feelings of the majority
of the American people.

Typical comments by major newspapers

sho~ed that "the American people ate behind this program for
assisting nations resist the evils of Communism. 2
The major issue which caused the negative public sentiment was the by passing of the United Nations.

The National Council

of American Soviet friendship opposed the aid program.

This organi-

zation secured a list of two hundred churches that opposed the
United States doing what the United Nations was constructed to do.

3

The Methodist Federation for Social Action opposed the aid program
beca.Jse it disregarded the machinery of the United Nations. 4

It

urged Congress to reject the proposals, because they were dangerous
to the free world.

1 "Policya

Acheson Compromise,"Newsweek, (April 14, 1947),

P• 29.
2
The New York Tim~s,
3rhe N~w Yo1:k
Iime§,

April 4, 1957 'P• 27.

4The Ni:w YQ.:k Tim~§,

March 20, 1947, P• 29.

April 5, 1947 'P• 17.
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Leadership of the Congress
On March 12, 1947, President Truman gave Congress a

special message requesting 400 million dollars to contain aggressive communism in Greece and Turkey.

He asked them for

assistance by March 31 because Britain would have to withdraw
aid on that date.

He outlined the grave international situa-

tion that had developed and cited the request from Greece asking
for the aid.

He stateds

I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure. I
believe that we must assist free people to work out their
own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help
should be primarily through economic and financial aid,
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes • • • • I therefore ask the Congress to
provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in
the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30,
1948 • • • • In addition to funds, I ask Congress to
authorize the detail of American civilian and military
personnel to Greece and Turkey at the request of these
countries, to assist in the task of reconstruction and
for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial
and material assistance as may be furnished. 1
This statement telling of our support of free people was
described by the

Omaha World Telegram as "the most breath-taking

statement ever made in time of peace by an American President or
statesman." 2 This policy officially challenged the Russians in
its cold war tactics against the free world.
Congressional reaction to the historic address was varied.
Some congressmen viewed it as "a world wide Monroe Doctrine."

1

Koenig, Truman Administration, pp. 299-301.

2
crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy, p. 56.

-17Others thought of it as a declaration of war against Russia .
However, there was general concern over the President's failure
to link the aid program to the United Nations. 1

Senator Vanden-

burg resented the proposal because of its vagueness.

He accused

the Administration of not informing Congress fully and for using
delaying tactics.

He said that the message was too anemic

generally. 2 He asked Republican members to turn in questions
on the program for clarification.

He thought this was needed

before congressional backing could be expected.

3

The State De-

partment received over four hundred questions and chose to
answer a hundred questions which were typical and circulated the
answers among congressmen. 4

Under the supervision of Acting

Secretary Acheson, it took ninety-six long, single-spaced typed
pages to answer the questions. 5
Under-Secretary of state Dean Acheson discussed the proposal at committee hearings (Secretary of State Marshall was
attending a foreign ministers meeting in Moscow).
position to the measure very strong.

He found op-

He and the Acting Secretary

of Navy, James Forrestal, answered questions before the Senate
6
Foreign Relations Committee on March 13.
He conferred with them
1c. P. Trussell, The New York Times, March 13, 1947, pp. 1-4.
2James Reston, The New York Times, March 14, 1947, p. 2.
3C. P. Trussell, The New York Times, March 21, 1947, pp. 1, 12.
4crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy, p. 58.
5Arthur Krock, The New York Times, April 14, 1947, p. 22.
6c. P. Trussell, The New York Times, March 14, 1947,

PP• 1, 2.
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again on March 24 in his effort to gain the support of members who
opposed the measure.

There was great opposition to the measure

and this was noticeable during the hearings. 1

Acheson, on behalf

of the President, appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20 and told them that the Greek-Turkish Aid
Program would not precipitate a war.

He urged them to approve

the measure as soon as possible and that the danger would be
greater if we refused to answer the request. 2
The main objections to the Greek-Turkish Aid Program
weret

(1) it had failed to use the machinery of the United Nations,

(2) speculation that this sort of spending would establish a precedent which would lead to more spending in the future, and (3)
this kind of program would lead to war with Russia. 3
In attempting to ansver the first question, Warren Austin,
klerican delegate to the Security Council and former Republican
Senator from Vermont, wrote a letter to Congress and stated that
the proposed aid was in harmony with the United Nations.

The

State Department reportedly took the position that this measure
was necessary to block Soviet expansion and safeguard our national
interest. 4
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the plan
by a vote of 13-0.

The measure that was approved by the Committee

le. P. Trussell, Th~ New York Time§,

March 25, 1947,

2c.

March

P. Trussell, The N~w Yor~ Timt§,

3Crabb, Bi~ tti§~n For~ign Polic~, p.
58.
8
4 Ibid., PP• 58-59.

~,

1947,

P• 1.
PP• 1,12.

-19was entirely different from the administration measure.

Senator

Vandenburg added an amendment giving the United Nations the
authority to halt the aid whenever the General Assembly or the
Security council thought that the aid should terminate. 1
Senator Vandenburg opened debate on the measure on April

a.

He answered the charges made by the Russian spokesman to the

United Nations.

He asked for speed in dealing with the situation

in keeping with our traditions and ideals.

He said that the

danger would be greater, if we did not provide the aid, and keep
the strategic nations out of the Soviet orbit.

2

Senator Tom

Connally, chief Democratic spokesman on foreign affairs, made a
similar appeal for the protection of those nations which ~ere so
vital to our national interest.

During the heated debate, a

letter was read from Secretary of State Marshall.
congressional approval of the aid.

He asked for

The measure was soon passed.

Thirty-five Republicans and thirty-t~o Democrats voted for passage; while sixteen Republicans and seven Democrats voted
against it. 3
Secretary of State Marshall addressed a letter to Representative Charles Eaton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, and urged support of the proposal.

This was read to

members during the unprecedneted debate which saw members of both
1
C. P. Trussell, The New York Times, April 4, 1947, pp. 1, 8.
2rhe Ne~ York Times, April 9, 1947, p. 24.
3crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy. pp. 59-60. Additional
information was found in The Ne~ York Times, April 23, 1947, P• 1.
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parties laud and denounce the measure.

A Democrat said the

measure was "an undeclared declaration of war."
were also divided on the measure.

Republicans

One said "the sons and

d'aughters of America will die on the battlefields · of Asia and
Europe to carry out this policy. "

Another used maps to dram-

atize the expan s ion of the Soviet Union and pleaded for support
of this measure to contain communism.

Both parties were divided

and each member was told to follow his conscience in voting for
the measure.
vote."

This comment was heard:

"I wish God I knew how to

Representative Eaton was influential in reducing resent-

ment to the measure.

The reading of the letter from Secretary

of State Marshall and the telegram from the United Nations
delegate warren Austin, ~as a factor in getting the House to approve the measure.
measure. 1

Twenty-five efforts were made to kill the

One hundred Republicans voted with one hundred and

sixty Democrats for passage.

One hundred and eight voted negat-

ively.

The House also adopted the Vandenburg proposal which
2
would link the aid to the United Nations.
The leadership techniques of the administration were of
mixed quality in attempting to achieve bipartisanship.

First,

President Truman had a ' secret conference with congressional
leaders, Secretary of State Marshall and Under-Secretary of State
Dean Acheson.

(May

The administraticn informed the bipartisan assembly

l 11Policy: Age for the Truman Doctrine, 11
19, 1947), P• 27.

2c.

Newsweek

P. Trussell, The New York Times. May 10, 1947, p. 1.
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about the grave situation that had developed and asked for their
support.

They were sworn to silence concerning the consultation.

1

During the first of March, Secretary of State Marshall sent copies
of the letter in which Greece asked for the economic assistance to
congressional leaders.

The letter had been received from the
Greek Embassy in Washington, D. c. 2
The President had a second consultation with key members
of both parties.

This conference involved fourteen members of

Congress and included the chairman of the two appropriation committees, party leaders in both chambers and influential leaders on
the foreign affairs committees. 3 The President informed key mem.,,
bers who had not been invited to the Conference on February 27 of
the situation in Greece.

He told them that he would need $250,000,000

for Greece and $150,000,000 for Turkey.

-

His consultation with the

key members of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee established the proper liaison. 4
The deviation from ideal procedure occurred when the
Administration failed to get consultation at an earlier date.
This caused much of the opposition to the measure.

If he had

conferred with key members of Congress immediately, he might have
1Richard W. Alstyne, .. A Study in American Responsibility,"
Current History (July, 1947), p. 2. Additional information is
found in The New York Times. February 29, 1947, pp. 1, 10.
2Bertram D. Hulen, The New York Times, March 5, 1947, p. 1.
3
Harold B. Hinton, The New York Times, March 8, 1957, p. 1.
4Harold Hinton, The New York Times, March 11, 1947, p. 1.

-22gotten the necessary legislation by March 31.

His delaying

tactics caused one of the discipl~s of bipartisanship, Senator
Vandenburg, to say that he wanted to be in on the "take-offs as
.

r

well as the crash landings . • 1 The administration also failed to
confer with many of the influential members of the Republican
party before the message to Congress.

The most prominent was

Senator Robert Taft, and he cited this as an example of partisan
pol
l 't'lCS. 2

President Truman had the notification from Britain for
three weeks before he had the first consultation with key members
of Congress.

He attributed the delay to his suspicion that Con-

gress would not approve of the aid because of its hostility
toward recent British loans.

Secondly, he wanted his message to

coincide with the arrival of Secretary of State Marshall in Moscow
to attend the foreign ministers meeting.

He said the message ~ould

have international implications and ~ould let the Russians know
that we ~ould try to contain her aggression in these strategic
nations. 3
The passage of the Truman Doctrine was largely the result of leadership from two agents of the President in the executive brmch, Secretary Marshall and Under-Secretary Acheson.
Acheson discussed the proposal at committee hearings, and the
letter received from Secretary Marshall came at the opportune
1
crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy. p. 60.
2
Ibid., PP• 60-61 .
3Koenig, Truman Administration, pp. 295-296.
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time.

The measure was also aided by Senators Vandenburg and

Connally in the Senate and Representative Eaton in the House.

CHAPTER III
POINT FOUR PROGRAM
Conception and Initiation
President Truman's Point Four Program ~as designed primarily to strengthen the industrial potentialities of countries
plagued by underdevelopment .

This condition was common to two-

thirds of the world's population and particularly the countries
in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and a few nations in
Europe.

These nations were unable to use their resources wisely

because of the shortage of trained personnel and available industrial information.

Their daily diet consists of the minimum

of calories and many of the people die of starvation or malnutrition.

There is a shortage of trained medical personnel,

hospitals and drugs .

The result is that many die from prevent-

able or curable diseases. 1
President Truman thought that this rehabilitation program
should be 'the concern of all free nations interested in thwarting
international communism and promoting democracy, commerce and
international brotherhood.

He urged other democratic nations to

assist in this project. 2
His first proposal to alleviate the problem associated
with the underdevelopment of large parts of the world provided

1u. s. Department of State, Point Four
Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 1-2.
2lli,g., P• 2.
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(Washington, D. C.:
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for the sharing of technical data with the participating
countries.

A

survey would be taken by the technicians to

determine the needs and the resources.

Our nation would pro-

vide for the training of personnel to operate the enterprise.
The second method of helping the countries attain economic
prosperity under the Point Four Program was the fostering of
investments.

Much of the necessary capital would come from

within the recipient nation but supplementary funds ~ould be
needed from the United States. 1
Point Four, as President Truman saw it, would strengthen
the industrial potentialities of the backward nations like the
Marshall Plan had done for Europe.

It would assist the nations

achieve a fair standard of living and keep them from turning to
the Soviet Union for support. 2 The plan came into his mind while
studying . world problems and thinking of how to create peace in
3
the \\Orld.
Leadership of Public Opinion
The President presented his "bold new program" to
Congress in his inaugural address of 1949.

In this speech,

he reaffirmed his support of the United Nation's protections
for free nations from aggression by Russia.

Ann s
CCLXX
P• 12.

He addressed

l Ibid., P• 3-4.
2Morris S. Rosenthal, "Point Four--Enough or Not at All,"
of the American Ac dem of Po i tic
Science,
July, 1950), P• 37.
3Anthony Leviero, The New York Times, January 28, 1949,
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again on June 24 and discussed the proposed legislation with
them.

He requested $45,000,000 to finance the program and

sought authorization to instruct the Export Import Bank to
safeguard American investments in these nations. 1 The President also discussed the proposals in his mid-year economic
message to Congress.

2

All of these messages provided the Pre-

sident with the opportunity to rally public sentiment.
After Congress failed to ratify the '9bold new program"
in 1949, President Truman continued to plead for it in 1950.

He

stated his request in his State of the Union Message and urged
Congress to ratify the proposal as soon as possible. Again he
stated the objectives of his program. 3 After discussing the
Point Four proposals in his economic and budget messages, he
made another plea for enactment of the proposed measure in a
special message to Congress.

He proposed a revision of taxes

on income derived from investments in foreign nations and the
protection for money invested abroad. 4
The President was assisted in rallying public opinion
by members of the executive branch.

Presidential Assistant,

John R. Steelman , addressed a luncheon meeting of the Executive
Clubs of Chicago and the Chicago Association of Commerce and
Industry.

He told them the wholly new program of President

1
James Reston, The New York Times,

P• 1 •

J ne 24, 1949 , P• l.

2c. P. Trussell, The New York Times. July 12, 1949 , , p. 1.
3Anthony Leviero, The New York Times, January 5, 1950 , , p. 1.
4
Anthony Leviero, The New- York
r1·mes,
Janu a ry 24 ' 1950 ,,
-
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Truman could bring about security and prosperity to the worl d. 1
Secret ary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brannon, presented the
proposals to a convention of the Association of Land Grant
Col l eges.

He told them that the sending of technicians to

the underdeveloped areas would raise the standard of living. 2
Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented the rehabilitation
program at the annual convention of the Congress of Industrial
Workers .

He told this assembly that the "bold new program"

would aid "two out of every three persons on earth."

The mes-

sage was greeted enthusiastically by the delegates who interrupted hi s address with applause. 3
Besides the messages to Congress pleading for enactment ,
President Truman addressed many organizations in rallying support
for his "bold new progra~1 He told a group of farm program
directors t hat the Point Four proposals to improve underdevelopment was l i nked to his desire to see an equal distribution of
capital i n the United States. 4

He addressed 15,000 citizens at

the J.neri c an Legion Convention and told them of his desire to see
American business make investments in the underdeveloped countries.
He also t old them of his confidenc e in the "bold new program" and
that it would be a factor in expanding the

0

world economy" and

1The New York Time§,

May 28, 1949 , P• 7.

2The New York
Timefb

October 27, 1949 , P• 23.

3The New York Times,

November 1, 1949 , P• 5.

4Fel i x Belair, Jr., The New York Times.

May 3, 1949, p. 13.
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balancing .,world trade. 111

In another effort to rally public

sentiment, he addressed the American Society of Civil Engineer s.
He assured them that the Point Four Program would show the world
t hat "the ideology backed by a moral code could do the most good
for the welfare of the world. 112 He presented the "bold new
program" at a dinner given for Mrs. Truman and him by the National
Democr atic Club, he told those citizens that his proposals would
be a r elevant factor in obtaining world peace.

He too said that

there wer e "enough of the good things in life in the world for
every man, woman and child in the world to have his fair share of
these good things." 3 His discussion in his foreign policy speech
at the unveiling of a statute of George Washington was packed with
the obj ective of his Point Four Program. 4
The•~old new program" received favorable public opinion
at t he outset.

It had the endorsement of the American people and

this was quite unusual for a program which would require elaborate
expendi tures to implement. 5 The program was endorsed by the
United States Council of the International Chambers of Commerce
and the National Association of Manufacturers.

Both of these

1.Anthony Leviero, The New York Times.

August 30, 1949 ,

2Anthony Leviero, The New York Times,

~ovember 3, 1949 ,

P• 1 •
P • 1.
3

Anthony Leviero, The New York Times,

ovember 9, 1949 , ,

P• 1, 9.

4rhe New York Times, (February 23, 1950), p. 3.
5Morris L. Lewellyn, "Down to Earth with Point Four,"
New Republic (July 11, 1949), pp. 18-19.
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organizations appeared before the United Nations and stated a
desire to make productive investments of a minimum amount if
. met concerning
.
.
tm ens.
t l
guran t ee 1s
1nves

Business leaders

surveyed by the National Industrial Conference Board were generally in favor of the Point Four Program•s objective of supplying our technical knowledge to the underdeveloped countries.
Business leaders who were opposed to the program based their
negative answers on the assumption that the aid would eventually
damag e our favorable balance of trade. 2
The vagueness of the program caused many organizations
to make recommendations.

The National Association of Manufac-

tures had a conference with President Truman and made recommendations concerning capital investments.
their support.

3

They also assured him of

The National Foreign Trade Council appointed a

special committee to formulate recommendations ·to implement the
program.

This organization was primarily interested in the in-

vestment and international trade aspects of the proposed program. 4
Articles in most leading magazines were divided on the
"bold new program"

Most believed that the aid to underdeveloped

countries would be beneficial to all the people.

The sending

abroad of technicians, scrupulous statesmen and persons of integrity

1The New Y~k Times,

\iay 22, 1949 , III, P• 1.

2The New York Times,

August 1, 1949 , p. 25.

3The New York Times,

February 8, 1949 , p. 22.

4Thomas F. Conroy, The New York Times.

III, p. 1.

April 3, 1949

-30would refute the propaganda charges of the Communists.I
Many articles in major magazines criticized the "bold
new program" as being an erroneous name for such a proposal.
The idea of sending technicians to backward nations has been
in operation for many years.

Some discussed various agencies

such as the Soil Conservation Service, and the Office of For eign
Agricultural Relations which were primarily giving technical
information to farmers in these underdeveloped areas. 2
The cost of the program caused much concern.

Many thought

the Int er national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the
Export-Import Bank were already the thing discussed by President
Truman i n his message to congress.

A

typical answer was "the

assumption that global government handouts or loans promote sound
private international investments, accelerate a return to f r ee
enterpri se, or speed up world recovery or world development, are
the ex act reverse of the truth." The error of such an assumption
was discussed by Henry Hazlitt, contributing editor of Newsweek,
in a fo r t y-eight page pamphlet.

3

Leadership of the Congress
President Truman discussed the objectives of his Point
Four Program in his inaugural address of 1949.

He told Congress,

We must embark on a bold new program for making the
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial prolHarold Ehrensperger, 11 Make Point Four Human,"
Christian Century. (August 16, 1950), P• 972.

lli

2william Vogt, "Let's Examine our Santa Claus Complex,"
Saturday Evening Post! (July 23, 1949), P• 17.
3Henry Hazlitt, "Global Spending Forever," Newsweek
(April 17, 1950), p. 79.

-31gress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas • • • • We should make available to peaceloving people the benefits of our store of technical
knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations
for a better life. And in cooperation with other nations,
we should foster capital investments in areas needing development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of
the world, through their own effort, to produce more food,
more clothing, more materials for housing and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.!
Members of Congress were wary on the "bold new program" and
it was received with great concern.

They wanted to know the scope

and application of the plan before making comments. 2 Congress
appreciated his support of the United Nations in his proposed aid
to under developed nations.

He by-passed the U. N. in his Greek-

Turki sh Aid Program in 1947, but Senator Arthur Vandenburg had
added an amendment empowering the world organization to terminate
the aid .

The

u.

N. was also by-passed in the Marshall Plan. 3

The proposed program was presented to the United Nations
by the Assistant Secretary of State Willard L. Thorp.
acti on to the message was varied.

The re-

The Latin American nations

and a f ew countries in Asia considered it to be full of "vague
promises way off in the distant future." From the advanced nations
in t he Western bloc, there was unanimous praise for the ambitious
pl an.

This presentation was needed because President Truman had

linked the "bold new program" to this organization. 4
1u.

s.

Department of State, Point Four, P• 1.
.
C. P. Trussell, The New York Times, January 21, 1949, p. 4.
3Thomas Hamilton, The New York Times, January 21, 1949,
2

P• 4.
P• 6.

4George Barrett, The New York Times, February 26, 1949,
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The drafting of the proposed aid bill was done under the
supervision of Assistant Secretary Throp.

He supervised experts

from other federal agencies ~hich had been assembled by Secretary
of state Acheson.

President Truman wanted this group of exp:!rts

to formulate proposals for him to consider.
l
what the proposals should encompass.

He was uncertain of

President Truman presented his proposals to Congress in a
25,000 word message.

He gave four reasons for the proposed aid.

First, he wanted to contain the menace of communism by assistirg
poverty stricken nations.

Secondly, the aid would expand trade

and assure this nation of vital raw materials.

Thirdly, Europe

was depending upon these nations for the bulk of their vital resources.

Fourthly, the aid in the development of these back~ard

areas would alleviate the causes of war.

Many congressmen thought

the measure was given at an inopportun~ time because Congress was
attempting to meet the financial requirements of existing programs.
However, his $45,000,000 proposal received a favorable reception
from many. 2
The members of the executive branch who explained the proposals to congressmen during committee hearings were James Webb,
Under-Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury John Snyder, who
discussed the guaranteeing of investments before the House Banking
Committee. 3

James Webb and Assistant Secretary of State Willard

1The New York Times, March 29, 1949, p. 29.
2James Reston, The New York Times, June 25, 1949, p. 1.
3The Ne~ York Times, August 18, 1949, p. 22.
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Thorp, discussed the proposals before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. They were given a cool reception by members of both
1
parties.
Secretary of Agriculture, Charles Brannon, discussed
the successes of the agricultural assistance program before the
House Foreign affairs committee. 2 Secretary of Interior A. Krugs
ended hearings for the Foreign Affairs Committee on October 7.

3

The President repeated his plan for economic and technical
assistance to underdeveloped countries in his state of the union
message on January 5, 1950.

He asked Congress to give prompt at-

tention to his "bold new program" which was designed to alleviate
misery and poverty. 4
The Administration and Republican forces led by Representative Christian Herter united on a compromise bill to replace
the original Point Four proposals.

Assistant Secretary of State

Willard Throp and Representative Herter endorsed the new bill.
The compromise bill laid down standards by which the United States
will aid in the financing of technical programs.
President Truman urged passage of the proposals for assistance to underdeveloped areas in a letter to John Kee, Chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee.

In pleading for favorable action,

the letter read "These measures are not acts of charity.

Neither

are they a waste of the resources of the United States.

They are,

1Clayton Knowles, The New York Times, September 28, 1949, p. 1.
2c1ayton Knowles, The New York Times, September 29, 1947, p. 17.
3Hanson Baldwin, The New York Times, October 8, 1949), p. 3.
4Anthony Leviero, The New York Times. January 5, 1950, p. 1.

-34i ndeed, the keystone of our protection against destruction of
another war and the terrible weapons of this atomic age." 1
The Point Four proposals was passed by the House on
Marc h 31, 1950.

After partisan debate on the issues, Represen-

tative Christian Herter was able to have $20,000,000 taken out
of the proposed $45,000,000. 2 The Senate approved of the Point
Four pr oposals on May 5.

Many efforts were made to kill the

proposed aid before it passed by a vote of 37-36. 3
Before a conference committee was set up, President
Truman sent a telegram to senator Tom Connally of Texas and
Representa tive John Kee of West Virginia.
port the $45,000,000 passed by the Senate.

"•

He asked them to supThe letter read

• • r eduction of the amount would not only hamper effective

work in t his field, but would also have serious political and
psychological reaction in these areas where confidence in the
firm determination of the United States is crucial. 114
The conferees agreed on $34,500,000 for the "bold new
program , " and certain standards were laid down for investors to
follow .

Investments would be guaranteed against expropriation

or seizur e of property by any nation receiving benefits from the
Economic Cooperation Administration for a fee of 4 percent for
insurance.

For a fee of l percent, the gover nment would guarantee

1Anthony Leviero, The New York Times, March 26, 1950, P• 1.
2Felix Belair, The New York Times. April 1, 1950 , p. 1.
3Felix Belair, The New York Times.
4Felix Belair, The New York Times.

May 6, 1950 . p. 1.
May 12, 1950 , P• 9.
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the convertibility of currency. 1 The Point Four meaures was
passed by the House by a vote of 247 to 88.

2

The Senate

approved of the measure by a vote of 47 to 27. 3
4
by President Truman on June 5.

It was signed

The executive branch did not follow ideal procedure in
attempting to achieve bipartisanship.

Ideal procedure called for

consultation before a decision is made, but the "bold new program"
was an integral part of the inaugural address.

The message was

¥1ri tten without any consultation from members of either party.

5

However, before his special message on June 24, 1949, Assistant
Secretary of State Thorp consulted Representatives Christian
Herter and John M. Veys in the preparation of the proposal.

6

Another deviation from the ideal procedure occured when
the executive branch failed to consult the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees.

These committees

would have . been an acceptable liaison channel.

The only con-

tact with the foreign relations colM\ittee occured when Assistant
Secretary of State Gross met with the members in an executive
1charles E. Egan, The Ne\tl York Times, May 16, 1950, P• 1.

2c.

P. Trussell, The New Xork Time§, May 24, 1950, P• l •

3c. P.

Trussell, The New York Times, May 26, 1950, P• 1.
4 Anthony Leviero, The New York Times, September 9, 1950,

P• 1.

5
6

Koenig, The Truman Administration, p. 291.
James Reston, The New York Times, May 26, 1950, p. 4.

-36session and asked them to give prompt attention to the proposed
.d l
al•
President Truman issued an executive order on September
8, 1950 which created two agencies to assist him with the Point
Four Program.

They were the International Development Board and

the Interdepartmental Advisory Council of Technical C.Ooperation.
The y cooperated with the ?resident in providing technical aid· to
underdeveloped countries.

The President would also designate part

of t he $34,500,000 to the United Nations Technical Assistance
Program. 2

1James Reston, The New York Times,

June 15, 1949,, P• 14.

2Allthony Leviero, The New York Times, . September 9, 1950 , ,
P• 1.

CHAPTER IV
FORMOSA RESOLUTION
Conception and Initiation
The problem of Formosa was inherited by the Eisenhower
Administration in 1953.

Taiwan or Formosa ~as taken from J~an

after World War II and tentative plans were made to put the island
under the Nationalist government under Premier Chiang Kai-shek.
However, before this materialized, Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communists had conquered all of China and forced Chiang's Nationalists
to vacate the mainland and settle on Formosa, the .Pescadores and
other small islands in the Pacific. 1 Some of the small islands
are the Tachens, which are two hundred miles from Formosa and
eighteen miles from the mainland; the Matsus, which are twenty
miles from the mainlands and seventy-five miles northwest of
Formosa, and the Quemoys which are directly across from Formosa
and five miles from the Communist controlled city of Amoy. 2
ColM\unist actions for the ne~t five years were never consistent and United States actions reflected firmness in containing
their expansion in the Pacific area.

President Truman protected

these islands by ordering the Seventh Fleet to patrol the area at
1

Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 161.
2rhe Ne~ York Times, January 30, 1955, IV, p. l.
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the inception of the Korean conflict.

In 1951, the Japanese

Peace Treaty was concluded in which she gave up Formosa.

In
1
September, 1954, Red ·China opened artillery fire on Quemoy.
The attack confronted the Eisenhower administraticn with
the problem of providing protection for the smaller islands in
the Pacific .

The administration opened discussions with Great

Britian about making an effort to secure au. N. cease fire
agreement in the Formosa Straits.

During this time, the United ·

States Senate approved of a defense pact with Chiang which pledged
this nation to defend Formosa but not the lesser islands.

The

nationalist forces agreed not to invade the mainland without
prior consultation with the United States.
The Coavnunist forces seized a lesser island named Yikiang
in January, 1955; and this prompted President Eisenhower to ask
for congressional authorization giving him the power to employ
the military forces of the United States in the Formosa Straits. 2
He wanted the authorization before an emergency occured and this
would let the aggressor know that any invasion would be met by
American forces in this area.

The President would authorize the

Seventh Fleet to patrol the area equipped with modern weapons. 3
Leadership in Molding of Public Opinion
In a televised conference, President Eisenhower defended
1

lli£..,

2

P• 1.

"Show Down With Red China," Business Week
1955), P• 27.
3nWhy u. s. is Ready to Fight in Formosa, 11
and World Report ! (February 4, 1955), p. 19.

(January 29,

u, s,

News

-39the resolution as a means of preventing war.

He did not name the

islands protected by the requested authorization because he thought
it would be impossible to be specific.l

He was assisted in rally-

ing public opinion by Secretary of State Dulles.

He addressed the

Foreign Policy Association in New York and defended the resolution.
He discussed the aggressive actions of the Communists and how the
authorization would contain Communism. 2
The Formosa resolution received a warm welcome from major
newspapers.

The New York Tribune stated that the prior authoriza-

tion would diminish the possibility of war.

The New York

Dailv

Mirrow stated that the resolution showed that the American people
were behind the Chief ~ecutive in defining our position in the

Pacific .

This prior consultation should reduce hostilities in

these areas.

The Courier-Journal in Louisville endorsed the mes-

sage and stated that the President is entitled to such unity.

The

Chicago Daily News lauded the President• s stand as "displaying
fine statesmanship ."

It appreciated his concern for the harmonious

relationship with Congress as a matter of proper and mutual respect.3 Public opinion was generally high in this program, and the
President was able to protect our national interest in the Pacific.

l•What Ike Says About Chances of War,"
World Report, (February 11, 1955), p. 31.
211 Dulles See Risk in Retreat,•

(February 25, 1955), P• 91.
3The

New

York Times,

u, s,

News and

U, S. News and World Report ,

January 25, 1955, p. 60.
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Leadership of the Congress
In a special message, President Eisenhower asked Congress
for unqualified authority to defend Formosa, the Pescadores and
to "permit attacks upon threating Chinese Communist concentration on near-by islands."
He saida
I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its
defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores
as provided by the treaty (with Nationalist China) now
awaiting ratification. But unhappily, the danger of
armed attack directed against that area compels us to
take into account closely related localities and actions
which, under current conditions, might determine the
failure or the success of such an attack. The authority
that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only
in situations which are recognizable as part of, or
definite preliminaries to an attack against the main positioo of Formosa and the Pescadores.l
To answer the criticisms that he had the right to command
the troops under the Commander-in-Chief clause, he stateda
Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commanderin-Chief. Until Congress can act, I would not hesitate, so
far as my constitutional powers e~tend, to take whatever
emergency actions might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the United States.2
He went further and requested that Congress approve a
suitable resolution authorizing him to employ the military forces
to protect those islands in the Pacific which are vital to the
security of Formosa.

The request for prior authorization reflected

that the United States was conducting foreign affairs on a
positive basis. 3
1The New York Times.

January 25, 1955, P• 3.

21.tu.sl.
3Hanson

P• 4.

w.

Baldwin, The New York Times

January 25, 1955,
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Speaker Sam Rayburn used his influence to have the resolution approved by a vote of 409. to 3 the next day.

He opposed

any amendment from the floor because he wanted to keep it in its
original form.

President Eisenhower praised the Housets prompt

actions and said this was "remarkable unity which should demonstrate the extent of American unity in this matter. nl

On June

26 , the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before the Senate Foreign
Relat i ons and Armed Services Committees and explained the scope
of t he resolution.

Thei~ explanation enabled the committees to

endor se the proposal.

2

The Senate was more hesitant about giving the President
such blanket authority, and debate was bitter.

Senator Wayne

Norse criticized the resolution as "a threat of aggression against
China . " Others feared that Chiang Kai-shek of an American·
general might start a war in which the U.S. is pledged to fight.
At this point, President Eisenhower consulted Senator Walter p.
George , Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
dean of t he Senate, to tell him that he alone would decide when
to use the grant of authority given to him by Congress.

Senator

George made a fiery speech in which he accused congressmen of not
showing unity in the face of the crisis.

He said "God keep us out

of war but if war must come let us draw a line and say that beyond
that line is a sanctuary which the enemy may not occupy and behind
3
which he may not retreat.• The speech melted the opposition and
lHanson

P• 4.

w.

Baldwin, The New York Times.

2William White, The New York Times.
3William White, The New York Times.

January 25, 1955 ,

January 26, 1955 , P• 1.
January 27, 1955, p. 1.
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the measure was approved of by a vote of 85 to 3.
Ideal procedure was followed by the executive branch in
attempting to secure bipartisanship.

Secretary Dulles held a

long conference with key members of the Senate Foreign Rel ations
and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The Democrats assured

him of their support on the measure but they wanted notice before
military action on aggressor. 1

The Republican leaders had en-

dorsed the resolution immediately after the loss of Yikiang
Island . 2
The President invited House Republican leader Joseph W.
Martin of Massachusetts to breakfast and discussed his resolution.
Representative Martin stated that the President has the constit utional authority to act in an emergency, but •he wants the suppor t
of Congre ss" to show the extent of American unity.

1William White, The New York Times,

January 21, 1955

PP• 1, 3.

2rhe New York Times,

January 19, 1955 , p. 3.

CHAPTER V
THE EISENHOWER

ocx;m INE

Initiation and Conception
The Eisenhower Doctrine was formulated to contain Communist penetr ations in the strategic Middle East.

The

Eisenhower Doctrine allowed President Eisenhower to safeguard
the va st oi l resources in this region, which supplies 75 percent of t he oil for Western Europe and is rich in chrome and
manganese.
Europe .

Geographically, the area connects Africa, Asia and

The Suez Canal links these continents together.

Senators concluded that the loss of this region would be unfortunate for the free world and v«>uld put the Soviet Union
near Africa.

The Soviet Union would out flank European on one

side and Africa on the other.

Our military bases in Wester n

Europe, So uth and Southeast Asia would be i n grave danger. 1
The nations in the Middle East had been achieving their
independence since World War I in a peaceful manner.

However ,

with the cold war in progress in 1946, they were e~periencing
a high degree of instability. 2 This instability was evident in
most of the nations in this area.

In Yemen, there was a little

war between the Yemeri and British forces on Aden•s frontier.
1"Senators Conclude& Eisenhower Doctrine vital to Save
Mide ast," U, S. News and world Report (February 22, 1957}, p. 86.
2The New York Times,

J anuary 6, 1947,
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p. 34.
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Syria was being governed by leftist forces who had received vast
amounts of weapons from the Soviet Union.

The Communists were

al so using this nation as a base to instigate dissention in the
Middl e East.

Egypt, under Colonel Gaael Abdel Nassar was linked

closel y to the Soviet Union because of weapons received.

Russia

had offered to send volunteers to assist Egypt during the Suez
crisis .

In Palestine, the Jewish-Arabs dispute was tense.

was instigat ing unrest and supplying the Arabs with weapons.

Russia
1

The President sought authorization from Congress to command the military forces into any nation in the Middle East to
thwart aggr ession providing the request for assistance was received from the nation.

Also, he so1..ght authorization to spend

$200 , 000 ,000 of already appropriated funds to assist these nations
in devel opment generally.

The {.Jlited States would be •filling

the vacuum cr eated in the area by Russia since the collapse of
the Briti sh and French influence in the Middle East.• 2
Leadership of Public Opinion
The Secretary of State, in a year end statement to the
press , made an attempt to make the public aware of the situation
that had developed in the Middle East.

After telling of our

concern fo r all "freedom loving and God fearing" citizens in
1
Repor!

"Chances of More War in Mideast,"
(January 18, 1957), p. 29.

2

Allen Drury, The

New

York Times.

u. s, News

and world

March 4, 1957, p. 1.
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this strategic area, he stated "during the coming year the United
States will have to accept an increasing responsibility to assist
the free nations of the Middle East and elsewhere, to maintain
their freedom and develop their welfare.
golden rule.

We must live by the

By serving others we serve ourselves.•

1

The President used his press conference to rally support
for his program.

He told the newsmen that the request was to

show solidarity on issues when our national interest is involved.
He said that his power as Commander-in-Chief could have been used
in deterring aggression, but he sought congressional sanction. 2
In another televised program, Vice President Richard Nixon pleaded
for the proposed resolution without alterations.

The focal point

of his discussion was that the proposed watering down of the resolution by a few congressmen would be disastrous to our national
interest. 3
The proposed resolution was endorsed by the National
Lutheran Council at its thirty-ninth annual meeting.

They re-

quested five million Lutherans to pray for the effectiveness of
the resolution . 4 The authorization empowering President Eisenhower to assist free nations to resist Soviet aggression by our
military and economic assistance was endorsed by the AFL-CI0. 5
1
The New York Times.

January 1, 1957 . , p. 2.

2william S. White, The New York Times,

January 24, 1957,

3Alvin Shuster, The New York Times January 23, 1957, p. 18.
4George Dugan, The New York Times February 2, 1957, p. 11.
5The New York Times. February 3, 1957., p. 38.

-46The American Legion endorsed the proposals through its National
Commander,

w.

C. Daniels.

The military section of the measure

was ~ndorsed by the Legion, but the economic section was vie~ed
with reservation.

The reservation was that Egypt, Syria, Jordan,

and Yemen were already infiltrated by Communists and the aid
~ould only let them purchase military equipment from Russia. 1
The proposed resolution came under partisan attack from
former President Harry S. Truman, former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, and the Democratic nominee for President, Adlai E.
Stevenson.

Harry S. Truman lauded the proposal at the outset by
"If I were a member of the United States Senate, I would

stating:

support the request of the President for congressional authorization to help the nations maintain their independence. 11

Also he

stated that the policy was belated and should have commenced
when the Russians began technical and military assistance to
Egypt .

2

On February 17, Truman changed his views on the program.

He addressed 2,000 delegates at the dinner session of the Israel
Bond Organization .

He told this delegation t.1-at the Eisenhower

Doctrine was "too little and too late."
tration of

11

He accused the adminis-

hiding behind the skirts of the United Nations," for

not having a firm policy of . its own in this strategic area. 3 This
negative speech was surprising because of his public endorsement
1William White, The New York Times, February 5, 1947, p. 4.
2Harry s. Truman, "Truman Tells Why He Favors the Eisenhower
Doctrine," U.S. News and World Report (January 25, 1957), p. 58.
3 Irving Spiegel, The Ne~ York Times, February 17, 1957, p. 1.
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of the program before the Senate committees.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, nourished the
Democrats

resentment to the proposals at the hearings of the

House Foreign Affairs Committee.

He contended that the President

has the authority to employ the military forces as Commanderin- Chief and asked the Co111111ittee not togrant the President such
a bl anket grant of authority.

He criticized the resolution as

too defective and stated that the Middle East crisis developed
because of the failure of the administration to stand behind i t s
promi ses to finance the Aswan Dam for Colonel Nasser of Egypt. 1
Adlai Stevenson, Democratic presidential candidate in
1952 and 1956, denounced the general request of President
Eisenhower.

He reiterated the campaign statement of President

Eisenhower in which he stated that our position in the world
was never better.

He said that the president was requesting

congressional sanctions to fight anywhere in the Middle East. 2
He said also that this kind of •rock and roll diplomacy .. caused
the l os s of many friends in the Middle East. 3
Senators, who were members of the Senate Foreign Relation s Committee, received mail in a ratio of 9 to l against the
Eisenhower resolution.

u. s.

The negative opinions seem to have in-

111 The Dulles-Acheson Debate Over Eisenhower Doctrine,"

News

and

World Report, (January 18, 1957), P• 35.

211The Eisenhower Doctrine, What? Why? When?;'

u, s,

News

and World Report, (January 11, 1957), P• 55.
1957,

3Lawrence E. Davies, The New York Times
P• 1.

,:;ebruary 17,
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creased Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas started the
bitter attack on Secretary Dulles during the committee hearings.

The letters reflected the fact that the prestige of

Secretary Dulles was on the wane. 1

A Midwestern Senator re-

ceived ten letters urging adoption and three hundred and fifty
against the authorization.

A mountain state Senator received

eight for the measure and thirty-three negative votes.

An

eastern Senator received twenty positive and t~o-hundred and
thirteen negative votes.

A west coast Senator received eighteen

positive and eight negative votes.

A southern Senator received

fifteen positive and one hundred and ten negative votes. 2

The

letters did not represent a valid public opinion sample, but
they showed some resentment in all sections of the nation.
Leadership of the Congress
President Eisenhower informed Congress of the conditions
which led to the proposed resolution on January 5, 1957.

After

giving cause of the agitation by the Communists and the importance of this strategic area, he saidt
• • • if the nations of that area should lose their
independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile
to freedom, that would be a tragedy for the area and for
many other nations whose economic life ~ould be subject to
new strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just
as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization • • • • All this would have the most

l
· E.W. Kenworthy, The New York Times, February 1, 1957, p. 3.
211

Dear Senator,"
22, 1957), PP• 52-53.

u,

S. News and World Report

(February
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adverse, if not disastrous effects upon our nation's
economic life and political prospect. 1
This special message was followed by his state of the
Union message on January 7, 1957.

He made an additional plea

for hi s Middle East resolution and urged speed by the Congress.
Al so , he cont inued to tell of his concern for people who enjoy
freedom and why the resolution would deter comunism. 2 He con-

tinued his plea on January 21 in his inaugural address. 3
Secretary of State Dulles
branch i n t he committee hearings.

represented the executive
He appeared before the House

Foreign Affairs Coavnittee on January 7 to discuss the proposed
resolution.

He urged speed and unanimity and said that delay

would be a tragedy to the free world. 4 His discussion of the
Middle Ea st proposals was helpful in getting the committee to
approve the resolution on January 24. 5 The House approved of
the two proposals by a vote of 355 to 61 under the bipartisan
leadership of Speaker Sam Rayburn, Democrat of Texas,and Joseph
• Martin , J r., Republican floor leader f r om Massachusetts.
Speaker Rayburn was able to get the proposal out of the coavnitt ee
6
and keep i t in the form requested by President Eisenhower .
Secretary Dulles received a bitter reception while presenting the proposed resolution before the Senate Foreign
1The New York Times, January 6, 1957 , P• 34.
2William White, The New York Times, January 11, 1957, P• 1.
3
The New York Times, January 22, 1957, P• 17.
4Joseph Loftus, The New York Times, January 8, 1957, P• l.
5william s. White, The New York Times. January 25, 1957, P• 1.
6william s. White, The New York Times. January 31, 1957, P• 1.
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Relations Committee.

Many Democrats, spearheaded by Senator

Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, waged an anti-Dulles drive and
questioned the competence of the Secretary.

This negative be-

havior prompted President Eisenhower to attend an informal
luncheon of Republican Senators and endorse Secretary Dulles
without reservation. 1
The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees approved of the economic aid section of the resolution
on February 13, but denied the authorization empowering the
President to employ the military forces in deterring aggression
at his discretion.

The President's request was modified and a

standard was set down.

The President could send the

u.

S. forces
2
into a nation if the recipient nation requested assistance.
The President and Secretary of State Dulles extinguished
much of the resentment by writing letters to Senator W~lliam F.
Knowland of California.

The letter from Secretary Dulles arrived

when the proposals were under attack from powerful Southern
Senators who feared the economic assistance section would involve
elaborate sums of money.

The Dulles letter assured them that the

administratim would not enter into any commitments which would
necessitate further appropriation. 3

The letter from President

Eisenhower enabled the Senate to reject an amendment proposeg by
1William
2w·illiam
3

s.
s.

White, The New York Times, January 30, 1957, P• 1 •
White, The New York Times, February l4t 1957, P• 1.

John D. Morris, Ih2 New York Tim~s, March 1, 1957, P• 1.
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Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

Senator Russell

wanted to restrict the econQmic and military sections in the Middle
Ea st resolution.

The letter stated that deletion of the economic

sections would .,gravely impair our ability to help these nations
preserve their independence.

The resolution is directed against

two dangers, direct armed aggression and indirect subversion.

To

counter one and not the other would destroy both efforts. 111
President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were pleased with
the revision in the Senate.

The House passed the original measur e

which would have given the President unlimited authority to employ
at his discretion.
stitute .

The Senate modified this request with a sub-

The Senate revision read that the President could commit

the fo r ces if he deemed it necessary.

The House passed the Senate

version without any conferees. 2Ideal procedure was followed by President Eisenhower very
closely i n attempting to achieve unity in foreign affairs.

Secre-

tary of State Dulles had a conference with Secretary General Dag
Hammarskj old of the United Nations to discuss the situation that
had developed in the Middle East.

This consultation gave the

administration the policies of the

u.

N. in attempting to contain

Soviet aggression in this strategic area.3
The President outlined his intentions to key congressional
leaders of both parties on January 1, 1957.

He solicited their

1William White, The New
2wayne Phillip, The New
3william S. White, The

York Times, March 8, 1957 , PP• 1-2.
York Times, January 1, 1957, P• 1.
New York Times. January 2, 1957, PP•

1-2.
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support in approving a declaration that our nation stand ready to
deter Soviet aggression in the Middle East.

He assured them that

the proposed resolution would be a joint product in all aspects.
This r elationship was requested by Speaker Rayburn who asked fo r
congressional participation on the proposal from the beginning to
the end.

President Eisenhower also thanked them for thei r par t i -

cipation and for the bipartisan cooperation they had given him
on his fore i gn policy programs. 1
The second consultation occured on January

2, when

Secretar y Dulles presented a draft resolution to congressional
leaders i n the House of Representatives.

The bipartisan a ssembly

heard him ask for a blanket grant of authority to deter aggr ession
and for aut horization to provide economic assistance to nat ions
requesting it.

After this conference, he discussed the content

of the proposal with a bipartisan group of Senators and key members
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 2

Both of these meetings

with these bi partisan assemblies were attempts to secure uni t y in
foreign af f airs.

The administration had held consultation wi t h

members of both parties far in advance of the President's fo r ma l
message to Congress.
new points .

This gave the President a full exchange of

Key leader s of the Senate Foreign Relations and House

Foreign Affairs committees were also consulted as acceptable
l i aison per sonnel. 3
1Will i am
2William
3William

s.
s.
s.

White, The New York Tim~§, January 2, 1957, PP• 1-2.
White, The New York Tim~§, January 3, 1957, PP• 1,2.
White, The Ne~ York Times, January 15, 1957, P• 1.
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The Secretary of state consulted Senators L.B. Johnson,
Democrat of Texas, and William F. Knowland, Republican of California, during a heated debate and was assured of their support.
The two Senators were the floor leaders of their respective parties and this helped passage of the authorization. 1

Ideal pro-

cedure was followed very closely and the President was given the
authorization.

1
William S. White, The New York Times, February 25,
1957, P• 1.

CHAPTER VI
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIOO OF THE TRUMAN AND
E ISENHCMER PERFORMANCE

Initiation and Conception
The objective of the four foreign relations programs initiated by Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower was
to contain the global expansion of the Soviet Union.

This con-

tairunent policy was necessary to keep other nations from joining
Finland , Poland, Hungary, Czechoslavakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and
Bulgaria which had fallen into the Soviet orbit before 1947.
The Truman Doctrine enabled the Greek government to defeat
the rebels in 1949 and kept Greece from falling into Communist
control .

Besides military assistance, the economic assistance

enabled her to repair the highways, bridges, railroads, expand
her agricultural program and reduce the malaria problem.

The

Point Four Program strengthened underdeveloped nations by raisi ng
their standards of living.

This development retarded the Russian

imperi alism which preyed particularly on na t ions living in abject
poverty .

Both of these programs which restricted Comunist ex-

pansion after World War II were conceived under President Tr uman•s
leadership t o promote the national interest.
The Eisenhower administration extended the containment
pol i cie s r elative to Soviet expansion.
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The Formosa Resolution
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authorized President Eisenhower to draw a line in the Pacific
and war n any aggressor that any military movement over the line
will be met by our military forces in the area.

The tact by

which the President went about defining our interest in this
area was an excellent example of statesmanship.

It is believed

by many t hat if this kind of leadership technique had been employed during the Trt.man tenure, United States losses to the
Communi sts world have been minimized.

The Eisenhower ooctrine

contained Communist expansion in the Middle East through military
and economi c assistance.

The President was given author ization

to order themilitary forces into any nation in the Middle East
requesting assistance.
On t he basis of the foregoing programs, the writer has

been abl e t o conclude that the Eisenhower administration had the
better timing in the initiation and launching of the programs it
proposed .

Both Presidents were effective in seeing the interna-

tional problems and initiating positive programs to promote the
nationa l i nterest.

However, President Truman deviated from ideal

procedure in both of his programs.

In the Greek-Turkish Aid

Program , the vagueness of his proposal

arid his failure to inform

Congress of the loan earlier caused great resentment on Capitol
Hill .

This caused Congress not to grant the loan by the deadline

of the Br itish assistance.

The ambiguity of his message caused

similar r esentment to his Point Four Program. It took sixteen
months to get this "bold new program" enacted.

President Eisen-

hower launched his Formosa Resolution and his Middle East plan at

-56the opportune time.

His requests were clear and Congress gave

prompt attention to the messages.
ieadership of the Congress
There was a marked difference in the legislative leader ship of these two men as organs of foreign relations concerned
with t he programs studied here.

One of the differences resul t ed

from t he general nature of the proposals presented to Congress.
President Truman, in his message outlining his Greek-Turkish
Aid and Point Four Program,left Congress and the public in
serious doubt as to the meaning of his proposals.
ness caused much of the delay in Congress.

This vague-

He asked Congress t o

authorize military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey by
March 31 , but his message did not give proper guidance and detail .

In order to receive clarification, Senator Vandenburg

invited Republican members to act as a fact finding board and
turn in a l i st of questions in writing about the proposed aid.
The questions were answered by the State Department and circulated on Capitol Hill.

This lack of clarity left room for

alteration and a substantially different measure was passed by
Congress .
The Point Four Program was announced in his inaugural
address to congress without enough preparation by the executive
branch.

This made many congressmen hesitant about supporting i t .

Some congressmen considered it as a political issue.

Al.so,

Republican leaders resented it because of its vagueness.

key

Pre-

sident Truman directed his Secretary of State Acheson to invite
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departmental chiefs to turn in proposals for his "bold new
program" after his general announcement to Congress.

Again,

this lack of clarity and preparation made for delay and paved
the way for alteration and compromise of the measure given to
Congress by the Truman administration.
In both of his programs, President Truman was less
successful than President Eisenhower in persuading members of both
parties to forget partisan difference and unite behind his program.

During the Greek-Turkish aid proposals, President Truman

was not able to use the influence of his office to have his progr am enacted as presented, and consequently, compromise measures
were accepted by the administration.

However, Secret·a ry of State

Marshall (in Moscow attending a foreign ministers conference)
sent telegrams to Senator Connally and Representative Eaton.

The

me ssages arrived at the 'opportune time and it diminished much of
the resentment to the bill.

In May, 1950, President Truman was

successful in obtaining $34,500,000 for his pcint Four Program.
His telegram to Senator Connally and Representative J.
West, who were conferees on the conference committee, probably
helped.

The conference committee was needed because the Senate

had passed the $45,000,000 which was requested and the House had
reduced the proposed amount by $20,000,000. ' Passage of the compromise measure was sixteen months after the original message.
It seems reasonable that more adroit legislative leadership by
President Truman would have reduced this delay.

-58President. Eisenhower had more success with his two programs.

He asked Congress for prior authorization to defend

Formosa and the Pescadores Islands in the Pacific to permit attack
upon threating Chinese Conwunist concentrations on near-by islands.
This request was approved by the House the next day after only three
hours of debate.

In the Senate, the authorization came under bitter

attack from members who were reluctant about granting the request.
They feared that Chiang or some American
war.

general might start a

The President consulted Senator Walter George, dean of the

Senate and Chairman of the Senate Relations Committee, at the opportune moment.

Senator George defended the proposed resolution

in a commendable manner and resentment to the measure dissolved.
It was passed 85 to 3.

It took only four days for Congress to

grant the complete request of the President.

The congressional

sanction enabled the President to define our interest in this area
and tell aggressor that any trespassing over the line will be met
with modern instruments of war.

Here it seems that adequate ex-

planation of the proposal upon presentation and timely legislative
collaboration were factors in Eisenhower•s success.
The President asked for another authorization to provide
military and economic assistance to nations in the strategic
Middle East under attack from communist forces.

Again, the House

passed the proposals without alterations, and the Senate reacted
I

with suspicion .

In a heated debate led by . Senator J. William

Filbright, many Senators questioned the competence of Secretary
Dulles .

This prompted President Eisenhower to attend an informal
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luncheon with Senators and defend his Secretary of state.
Secretary Dulles had spent six days outlining the proposals at
hearings.

This amounted to twenty-five hours and thirty-eight

minutes that he answered questions before the combined Senate
Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Service Committees.

Many

Senators opposed the economic assistance until letters addressed
to Senator William F. Knowland were read assuring them that the
program would not necessitate further expenditures.

The letters

were from President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles and Assist~nt
f
Secretary of State Robert C. Hill.

This assurance from the

executive branch enabled the measure to be passed by a surprising 58 to 25.

The passage of the authorization was due to the

pressure of communication.

The Eisenhower administration accepted

a compromise bill, but the President and Secretary Dulles were
pleased with it.

The change had the effect of putting greater

responsi bility on the President and of avoiding the constitutional
issue of whether the President already had this authority.
In addition to the techniques already discussed, the
writer used bipartisanship to indicate the relative effectiveness of the legislative leadership of these Presidents.
administration, following this principle,

Truman's

1dertook the most in-

tensive consultation between spoke man for both parties witnessed
since the San Francisco Conference
was announced.

~efore the Truman Doctrine

Nevertheless, the procedure was defective.

In a

secret conference with congressional leaders on February 27, 1947,
President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall, and Under-Secretary
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of State Dean Acheson made an urgent appeal for congressional
support of the proposed loan to save the Greek ,regime.

In this

consultation, members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House
Foreign Affai r s Committees from both parties were present to act
as the acceptable liaison.

The second consultation

was

with

congressmen who were not invited to the conference on February
27 .
port .

He i nformed them of the emergency and asked for their supI n his message to Congress, he asked for assistance to

Greece and Turkey.

The reason for the assistance to Turkey had

to be surmi sed because the President failed to inform congressmen
relative to Turkey.
The administration deviated f r om ideal procedure by not
informing congressmen of the crisis earlier.

President Truman

withheld the r equest from Congress for three weeks before the firs t
consultation.
31 .

On February 27, he asked for legislation by March

If he had consulted key congressional leaders i111mediately

after receiving the request, he might have · been able to receive
the proper l egislation by the proposed date.

He also failed to

consult influential Republicans in Congress before his speech and
this caused Senator Taft t o accuse the administration of oonsulting
Republicans when the policy was already formulated.

Another dis-

tinguished Republican leader, Senator Vandenburg, said that "he
wanted to be in on the take-offs as well as the crash landings."
The Point Four proposal did not receive strong bipartisan
support par tly because President Truman announced the program in
his ina ugural address in 1949, without any prior consultation with

-61Congr ess.

This by-passing of congressional leaders before an-

nouncement of the proposal caused resentment and took the .. bold
new program- sixteen months to get enacted.

However, before his

special message outlining the proposal to Congress on June 24,
1949 , Assistant Secretary of State Willard Thorp invited Representatives Christian Herter and John M. Voys to assist
formul ation of the proposal.

with the

Another effort to achieve biparti-

sanship occur ed when Assistant Secretary of State Gross discussed
the measure in an executive session before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.

This learning was after the measure had

been formulated by the administration.

The Tr\.Ullan administration

failed to have consultation before the announcement of its policies
and establ i sh an acceptable liaison.

Therefore, the efforts to

achieve bi partisan support were deficient.
The relative efficiency shown by the Eisenhower administration i n leading Congress shows a marked improvement over the
Truman administration.

During the Formosa crisis, Secretary Dulles

met in secrecy with Democratic and Republican leaders and with key
members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affai r s
Convnittees.

He informed them of the tense situation that had

developed i n the Pacific and asked for their support.

Democrats

expressed satisfaction over the proposal and urged the administration t o take positive action in intervening.

However, they

wanted t o be consulted before any serious action was taken.
President Eisenhower met with Senatorial leaders on January 18,
1955 , t o disc uss the Formosa situation.

-62The bipartisan leadership exercised by the Eisenhower
administ r ation followed ideal procedure very well.

Member s of

both parties partic ipated in the di~cussion of the proposed
resolution and discussion ended in agreement by all participants.
Under t he Eisenhower administration, the Senate Foreign Relations
and the House Foreign Affairs co1M1ittees were effectively used
for legisl ative executive liaison.
The Eisenhower administration continued this concern for
bipartisan action into the fight for the Middle East Resolution.
President Eisenhower discussed the proposed authorization befor e
key congressional leaders of both parties on January l, 1957, and
asked for t heir support.

He assured them that this would be a

joint product of both branches.

On January 2, Secretary Dulles

presented a dr aft resolut ion to congressional leaders of both
parties of t he House and senior members on t he Foreign Affairs
ColMlittee.

Af t er this consultation, Secretar y Dulles discussed

the proposal with Senatorial leaders and members of the Senat e
Foreign Rel ations Committee.

Ag ain, t he administration followed

ideal procedure in achieving a substantial degree of party unity
in foreign affairs .
On the basis of the information considered here P~esident
Eisenhower was the more effective as a legislative leader in obtaining positive programs which promoted the national interest.
The authorizations were warnings to the Communist world that the
United States is ready to use force to deter aggression.

This can
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be compared with the Monroe Doctrine because both were warnings
to nations seeking to e~tend their domination over free peoples.
It i s important to note that during the Truman tenure some of
the most important phases of the programs that were ultimately
approved involved amendments proposed by Senators.

Both of the

mea sures evaluated were compromise measures drawn up by Senators.
The Truman legislative leadership failed to provide Congress with
proper data and consequently, compromise measures were facilitated .

On the other hand, President Eisenhower used more pressure

to get his program enacted.

His communications to key congressional

leaders and his informal visits at a Senatorial luncheon, were
positive techniques that were used at the opportune time.
In ·another aspect of legislative leadership, the Eisenhower administration was best able to achieve unity in foreign
affairs by following ideal proced~re.

The consultations were

held before the announcements and the acceptable liaison was
established by using the legislative committees.
Leadership in the Molding of Public Opinion
In the molding of public opinion, the President is in a
pre- eminent position.

He can rally public sentiment by speaking

before var ious organizations.

His contact with the reporters

at the pr ess conference and his messages to Congress are important
means of influencing the attitude of the public.
t he people confidence.

His voice gives

By using the foregoing techniques as
\

guides, the writer will evaluate the leadership of these Presidents
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in molding public opinion.
On the basis of the information in each chapter, Presi-

dent Truman's administration used techniques to mold public
opinion more intensively than the Eisenhower administration.
This i s not to say that the results were great.

President

Truman and members of the e~ecutive branch addressed many organizations in atte~ting to rally public opinion behind the
programs.

President Truman discussed his .. bold new program"

with many organizations during the si~teen months the program
was in Congr ess.

The consistency with which he discussed the

proposals led Anthony Leviero, distinguished writer for the New
York Times, to write on November 3, 1949, "he never fails to
strike thi s note" (President Truman was discussing the Point
Four Progr am at a luncheon for Mrs. Truman and him).

On the

other hand , President Eisenhower did not travel about presenting
his proposals to organizations in attempting to manufacture public
opinion .

However, he was able to discuss his proposals at his

press conferences.
There was a marked difference in the popularity of the
four programs.

The newspapers and other soundings of public

opinion r eflected that the American people greeted the cont ainment progr ams of President Truman enthusiastically.

The by-

passing of_ the United Nations caused negative sentiment toward the
Greek-Turkish Aid Program, but the amendment added by Senator
Vandenbur g diminished the resentment.

The containment programs

of President Eisenhower failed to have such positive sentiment.
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The Formosa Resolution received a warm welcome from major
newspapers and other soundings of public opinion.

However,

the Eisenhower Doctrine caused negative sentiment, and this
was verified by letters sent to congressmen.

It seems likely

that much of this adverse public sentiment could have been
diminished if the President had carried his request to the
people.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
In stating an hypothesis, the writer stated:
Professor Binkley stated a commonly accepted theory
respecting the role of strong executive leadership in
both parties. He stresses the fact that the Democratic
party, as a general rule, tends to produce and support
strong executive leadership in government. The Republican Party, on the other hand, has an historical tendency to
oppose strong executive leadership in government and favor
legislative supremacy with respect to the executive power.
The difference between the general tendencies of the two
major parties on the question of strong executive leadership is a result of the 1reater influence of conservatism
in the Republican Party.
On the basis of information that was collected and considered by the writer in this study, Professor Binkley's theory
is not valid as applied to the two leaders here and the two
programs each promoted.

The writer evaluated the performances

of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenho~er as organs
of United States foreign relations in the office of President of
the United states by three criteria of ideal executive procedure.
The criteria are:

(1) Leadership in the Conception and Initiation

of Programs, (2) Leadership in the Molding of Public Opinion, and
(3) Leadership of the Congress.
On the basis of the evidence, President Eisenhower appears

to have provided the most effective leadership in the initiation
and conception of programs and the leadership of the Congress.

-66-

-67-

Pr esident Truman appears to have provided the most effective
l eadership in the molding of public opinion.
After stating the findings or conclusions, it is necessary for the writer to point out some other factors.

President

Truman was President during the post war years and the nation
was coming back to normalcy.

Professor Edwards. Corwin, dis-

tingui shed authority on the presidency, stresses the fact that
the Pre sident can provide positive leadership when the nation is
in a crisis.

However, when conditions in the nation are peace-

ful , t he l eadership role is very complicated.

President Eisen-

hower was sworn in as President of the United States in 1953.

His

two relevant assets were his popularity and the nation was providing men and equipment to the United Nations troops in the Korean
conflict .

I f Professor Corwin's theory is valid, President

Eisenhower had the opportunity to provide effective leadership
without too much agitation.

It is necessary to remember that it

may have been much easier for President Eisenhower to get results
for these and other reasons.
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